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Deminer working in a minefield during KCCP operations.
Photo courtesy of ATC.

special focus on livelihood support such as food security and

•

Conclusion

Following completion of the KCCP,

the alleviation of poverty.

all known recorded hazards will be re-

The KCCP will contribute toward

moved from the city (except some re-

Afghanistan’s States Parties’ ob-

sidual threat from exposure of any

ligation to the Convention on the

subsurface UXO that appears during

Prohibition of the Use, Stockpil-

construction work, movement of ERW

ing, Production and Transfer of

from other areas or identification of new

Anti-personnel Mines and their

hazardous areas), and civilian accident

Destruction (also known at the

rates are expected to substantially de-

Anti-personnel Mine Ban Con-

cline. Also, a number of people trained

vention or APMBC); it is expect-

as deminers during the implementa-

ed that by March 2013 all known

tion of this project will be given op-

mined areas will be cleared from

portunities to be hired as deminers on

Afghanistan.

other projects or to advance to higher

During the project implementation,

positions such as section leaders or team

ATC is building demining skills of the

leaders. As soon as funds are provided

recruited community members by con-

for Phase 2 of this project, and Phase 2

ducting on-the-job as well as off-the-job

is completed, 22 wards in Kabul will be

trainings. The off-the-job trainings in-

announced free from hazards of known

clude review of demining techniques,

minefields. The cleared land will be used

lessons learned, mine-risk education

for housing, agriculture, livestock pas-

and first aid at their base camps after

turing, leisure activities, development

leaving demining sites. During the first

projects and industrial revitalization,

12 months, the selected deminers and

and the people who live close to the

section leaders underwent capacity-

cleared areas will be able to live safely.

development training, and if the project
continues through a second year, section leaders will be trained to take over
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Thailand and Compliance with
the APMBC: Mission Impossible
... Or a Feasible Task?
This article addresses the mine-action challenges Thailand faces in maintaining compliance with the
Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention. Given the uncertainty of mine locations and the Thailand Mine
Action Centre’s limited capacity, the delegation of Thailand’s mine-action resources can be an issue,
as hazardous areas can be difficult to determine. The emergence of a new national land-release mineaction standard, however, means that Thailand’s ability to efficiently identify hazardous areas will allow
limited resources to be appropriately assigned to areas needing clearance.
by Håvard Bach [ APOPO ]

T

he Khmer Rouge claimed yet another victim in July

shifted, thus leaving a blurred picture of where mines may be

2011, this time in Thailand’s Trat province near the

located. While evidence of mines in many areas exists, other

Cambodian border. This recent incident stemmed

from the legacy of fierce fighting played out between Khmer

currently suspected areas have no real evidence of mines other than a general suspicion stemming from past warfare.

Rouge and Vietnamese forces on both sides of the Thai-

A Landmine Impact Survey was undertaken in Thailand

Cambodian border in the 1980s. The war is finished, but ca-

from 2000 to 2001. More than 2,000 square kilometers (772

sualties continue.

square miles) were enrolled in the TMAC database and mis-

Fighting between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese

interpreted as a real representation of the mine problem.1

typically occurred on and around rocky hilltops and densely

Subsequent efforts to resurvey these areas have resulted in

vegetated ridges, leaving grim conditions for survey and clear-

the cancellation of almost 1,500 sq. km. (579 sq. mi.) of land.

ance. Most of Thailand’s mine-suspected areas are heavily

Today 540 sq. km. (208 sq. mi.) of land remains suspect.1 De-

overgrown with large sections scarcely populated and rarely

spite the good effort, Thailand cannot meet its APMBC dead-

visited because of the risk of potential landmines and explo-

lines without a radical change of direction and a structured

sive remnants of war. During the war, front lines regularly

approach to resolving the problem.

APOPO, a Belgian nongovernmental organization, partnered with a local Thai organization,
Peace Road Organisation (later referred to in this article as APOPO-PRO), and developed a
survey and land-release methodology for Thailand, which is being implemented in full cooperation with the Thailand Mine Action Centre, Thailand’s military, Thai Civilian Deminer Association and Norwegian People’s Aid. The process raises interesting questions related to how
mine-affected states will comply with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (also known as
the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention or APMBC).
The newly endorsed system challenges a common perception of how to resolve a mine problem for convention compliance. By analyzing how European countries justify compliance with the
APMBC, Thailand developed an approach that could enable full compliance within a reasonable
timeframe, and breaches traditional belief that it would take more than 100 years to rid Thailand of
landmines. Thailand’s solution may be an example of how similar problems could be addressed in
other countries.

team-leader positions.
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(77 sq. mi.) of land is still cancellable, a 25 percent sampling
requirement would require clearance of 50 sq. km. (19 sq. mi.)
and occupy all of Thailand’s clearance capacity for the next 20
years without clearing any of the confirmed-hazardous areas.
TMAC is aware of the situation and is making every effort to
restructure its own mine-action approach.
TMAC coordinates all HMAUs. Given the comparatively
small size of the national capacity, Thailand’s mine-action capacity must be used to clear proven, as opposed to perceived,
minefields. Focusing on proven minefields was not past practice, and the HMAUs consequently find very few mines, but

tinuing with the remaining provinces in 2012. Preparations
began in January 2011 and the survey was fully implemented
in June 2011.
Before implementation APOPO and TMAC jointly developed the conceptual national framework for land release.
National standards on survey and land release were developed, followed by a considerable outreach package. The latter included conducting two land-release workshops with key
participants from TMAC, the four HMAUs, NPA and The
Development Initiative. National survey and land release standards were reviewed and endorsed during the last workshop.

this does not imply that Thailand has few mines. On the contrary, APOPO-PRO found more than 140 anti-personnel
A TM-62 M Anti-Vehicle Mine typical of anti-tank mines
found in Thailand.
Photo courtesy of Colin King.

mines, as well as one anti-tank mine and 168 ERW, during the
first seven weeks of Non-technical and Technical Survey. Thailand (and many other countries) believes that areas that cannot be proven mine-free must be cleared or, as a minimum,
released by considerable Technical Survey efforts. In Thailand

Thailand’s Mine-action Capacity

The national mine-action capacity consists of four military

this perception caused the use of scarce clearance resources

Humanitarian Mine Action Units deployed along Thailand’s

in areas with little or no landmine evidence. Few mines were

borders. Additional capacities include the Technical Survey

found and few minefields were cleared. Despite a fairly suc-

teams of the partnerships between NPA and the Thai Civil-

cessful land cancellation process called the Locating Minefield

ian Deminer Association and APOPO and Peace Road Or-

Procedure, Thailand has never fully managed to dispose of the

ganisation; both of these partnerships became operational in

Landmine Impact Survey legacy. Clearance resources were

June 2011. A few other local organizations exist, but they lie

used indiscriminately to clear suspected-hazardous areas as well

dormant due to a lack of funds. Each HMAU clears approxi-

as sample cancelled land. The real lifespans of the minefields are

mately 0.6 sq. km. (0.23 sq. mi.) of land on average per year.

prolonged and as a result, accidents can occur.

2

Less than 2.5 sq. km. (0.97 sq. mi.) is cleared annually, and
a major part of the clearance capacity is occupied with per-

APOPO’s Survey Efforts

centage sampling of land that was cancelled through a desk

TMAC asked APOPO to conduct a Non-technical Survey of

assessment of old survey information. The policy was to sam-

all mine-suspected areas along the Cambodian border starting

ple 25 percent of cancelled land. Assuming that 200 sq. km.

in 2011 with the provinces of Chantaburi and Trat, and con-

Recent examples of mines discovered in Europe
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
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Four AP mines were found in Herdla, Norway in March 2003 according to the Norwegian press.
In August 2009, Patrick Ligtenberg, a Dutch treasure hunter, found a landmine with his metal
detector.
On 3 May 2010 a landmine was found and destroyed at a Bulgarian beach.
Sixty AP mines were found in Hattfjelldal, Norway in September 2010.
On 5 October 2010, newspapers in Holland reported that 700 AP mines were found in Zeeland
Cadzand.
Three more mines were found in another part of Holland on 24 May 2011.
In June 2011 the Norwegian Army issued a public warning to the civilian population in Kirkenes
about making fires in a popular recreation area just outside Kirkenes town because of the ERW
risk from World War II.
On 7 July 2011 a landmine was found in Varsenare, Belgium.
On 1 August 2011 five landmines were found in Quend, France.
On 30 August 2011 a man found an SMi-35 AP mine in his garden in Breda, Holland.
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The New National Standard

The new national mine-action standard for land release was
made to comply with International Mine Action Standards. It
emphasizes the need for tight evidence-based Non-technical
Survey of all mine-suspected areas in Thailand. The outcome
of the survey will form a baseline for what Thailand needs
to clear or release by additional survey to comply with the
APMBC. The standard’s overarching aim is to provide a useful framework for professional conduct of Non-technical and

APOPO-PRO Non-techical Survey field discussions in Trat
province. Small inaccuracies in data recording will have a major impact on the result. Quality training and regular monitoring of survey teams are key survey components.
Photo courtesy of the author.

Technical Survey, and justification for safe and effective land
cancellation and release. The Thai national standard explains
the principles of land release and the conduct of Non-technical Survey and Technical Survey. It also provides standardized reporting formats for:

•
•

Non-technical Survey
Land-release completion (Non-technical Survey,
Technical Survey and clearance)

•

Land reclassification
Informative documents in the standard include an exam-

ple of the APOPO-PRO Non-technical Survey scorecard and
the accompanying Technical Survey ground-coverage card.
The Non-technical Survey scorecard is a Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet where all possible sources and types of information are listed and given a generic value or score. The final
score is the accumulated value for all individual scores, and is
used to determine a degree of confidence in whether an area
is mined or mine-free. The confidence level will form the basis
for how much follow-on Technical Survey is required to declare an area mine-free after Non-technical Survey.
The ground-coverage card is similar to the Non-technical Survey scorecard. By assessing the quality of the assets
at collecting information during Technical Survey, developing a generic ground-coverage card is possible. If manual
mine clearance is the best method and has the highest probability of finding a mine, a f lail is slightly less suitable and
has a lower probability of indicating whether or not mines

are present. The same result can be achieved with the f lail
as manual demining in Technical Survey by increasing the
size of the area to be searched. The ground-coverage card
will inform deminers how much more land needs clearance.
All available assests will be assessed and given a generic value in the ground-coverage card.
Land Classification

TMAC, by cancelling 75 percent of SHAs from the LIS, has
previously defined the remaining suspected areas as minefields, labeling them dangerous areas and treating them as
confirmed- and defined-hazardous areas. However, a lack of
mine evidence in one area does not imply evidence of mines
in the remaining areas. In other words, just because some
SHAs are cancelled does not mean that the remaining suspected areas are contaminated and must be released by
Technical Survey and/or clearance.
Article 5 of the APMBC obliges States Parties to “make every effort to identify all areas under their jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to
be emplaced.”1 A Non-technical Survey should be considered
a minimum of such effort, and it will thus act as a baseline
for what must be addressed through Technical Survey and
clearance (and sometimes more Non-technical Survey) “to
destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines
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this happening in Thailand. TMAC has consequently agreed
to reclassify all currently suspected areas as SHAs. These
areas are not a measurement of the scope of the problem
but rather areas where a Non-technical Survey is needed.
Thailand considers Non-technical Survey as the first step in

Confirmed-hazardous areas should not be created due to indefinite fear of mines stemming from
past warfare or from a lack of proof that areas are actually mine-free. Such fear is rather a pointer
for investigation of real evidence. CHAs should also not be created due to a lack of access to distant
areas or a lack of information/informants in uninhabited areas. Only real mine evidence coupled
with a war-tactical assessment justifies the creation of a CHA.

complying with the APMBC—“to make every effort to identify all areas known or suspected as mined.”3
Time for Reflection

The principles of drawing CHAs and cancelling land
through a Non-technical Survey are fairly well understood.
However, flaws in the system puzzle operators, politicians and
mine-action authorities. Operationally, these flaws magnify
the mine problem, committing scarce resources to clear areas
that are eventually proven mine free and leaving CHAs uncleared for decades. If a CHA can only be designated as such
through evidence of mines being laid, what does this mean for
areas that cannot be reached during the survey or areas with
little or no information available about mines? These are typically large, scarcely inhabited or uninhabited areas that form
part of a wider combat zone but with no evidence of mines related to any specific location. Some mines may be in these areas, but identifying their location is impossible. Should these
areas be cleared, or does the APMBC deem it acceptable to
leave mines in the ground for future clearance, enacting government restrictions for future land use? Should the area then
maintain a classification as SHA or perhaps be cancelled?
Leaving an area as a SHA implies more survey is required,
which is not possible in the foreseeable future. Cancelling land
requires a fair certainty that no mines exist; most specialists
would hesitate to cancel such land. When survey detail is lacking, these areas are more often enrolled in databases as CHAs
(other terminology may be used, but the meaning is the same).
While statements like impact-free and mine-safe contradict the APMBC and could be seen as a shortcut to compliance,
Map of Thailand.

governments and operators in particular are looking for more

Courtesy of CIA Factbook.

efficient ways to release land and clear real minefields. They understand that by committing resources wrongly, the lifespan

not later than ten years after joining the treaty.”3 Failing to put

of the real, mined areas is prolonged significantly. Risk to local

into effect this Non-technical Survey distorted the scope of the

populations is proportional to the length of time these mined

mine problem in many countries and prevented an appropri-

areas remain active. Local people will start to use mined areas if

ate mine-action response to the problem. In Thailand, it has

they are not cleared. More accidents will thus occur than if real

resulted in a lack of focus on the real problem. Few mines were

mined areas (CHAs) are cleared more swiftly.

cleared, and the lifespan of real mined areas was extended.
Proactive Versus Reactive Response
Relabeling all Suspect Land as SHA
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Compliance with the APMBC requires a reasonable ef-

IMAS calls for a detailed evidence-based Non-technical

fort to identify the scope of the problem and subsequently re-

Survey as the minimum effort to create CHAs; only now is

move all mined areas identified during this process. As this
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is required for APMBC compliance, we call this a proactive

strictions may materialize as special clearance requirements

response. The convention further commits signatories to re-

on new construction sites or as restrictions on general land

spond swiftly and remove mines if they are found later. We

use. Using fire is prohibited or restricted in some areas. Com-

may call this a reactive-response requirement. It requires a

mon agreement exists on the soundness of this policy, which re-

stand-by capacity that can swiftly remove mines not identified

sults in very few accidents over time. However, this approach

during the process of proactive clearance.

must not be confused with the situation in the Falkland Islands,

To explain this further, we may look to Europe. Many

for example, or the beaches in Skallingen in Denmark. Mines

European countries had problems with mines after World

in these areas are known to be in specific locations and should

War II. The proactive response could be defined as survey

thus be cleared during the proactive-response phase.

land and clear all known mined areas. In Norway, this re-

Assessing Europe’s experience is useful when attempting

sulted in some 750,000 landmines cleared in four years. Oth-

to ensure other nations’ compliance with the APMBC. Such

er European countries had similar responses, and millions of

an assessment shows that convention compliance is a two-

mines were found and destroyed. Despite most of the mine

stage process of proactive and reactive response; it should

problem being resolved by 1949, a proactive survey and clear-

form the basis for understanding how countries may address

ance response was maintained well into the 1960s in a few ar-

their own problems more effectively while complying with the

eas. Beyond 1949, most countries moved from a proactive to

convention. Mines remain in Europe, but the proactive effort

a reactive response and actively stopped looking for mines in

to remove them has finished and the reactive effort continues.

favor of reactive stand-by (military) capacities. This process

Finding the remaining mines through survey is unreason-

is ongoing today. Mines are still found from time to time in

able and impossible because they could be anywhere with-

Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Norway, Spain and the

in larger, typically uninhabited areas. Clearing these areas

United Kingdom.

would require enormous resources, and we would all agree

European countries nevertheless consider that they have
made every effort to identify mined areas through survey and

that Europe’s reactive response is not only appropriate, but it
also complies with the convention.

remove all known mines through clearance. A small residual
risk of mines remains, but revitalizing a proactive response

APOPO-PRO’s Non-technical Survey in Thailand

is considered unreasonable. One way Europe deals with this

Expert group. An expert group consisting of experi-

small but constant residual risk is by restricting land use. Re-

enced staff from TMAC, HMAU and APOPO-PRO was

TMAC’s Area With Restrictions report explains area with restrictions as: “when all reasonable effort has been made to conduct a Non-technical Survey in an area (typically a SHA) but a lack of access to the area or shortage of information/informants has prevented conclusive cancellation of
land or the creation of CHAs. AWRs are typically scarcely inhabited or uninhabited areas (forest,
mountain areas, long-term flooded areas/dams etc.) where there is no concrete evidence of mines
related to any specific part of the wider area. The residual risk of mines is deemed small, which justifies a shift from a proactive mine-action effort to a reactive mine-action response if mines should
occur later.”4
When survey organizations fill in the national Area With Restrictions form they are obliged make
the statement: “We have made all reasonable efforts to survey the area through the conduct of evidence-based Non-technical Survey. The survey was inconclusive because of either a lack of access
or shortage of information/informants. We found no evidence of mines in specific parts of the area.
Since the survey was inconclusive, we request the area to be reclassified as Area With Restrictions.
Type and level of restriction should be determined by TMAC in collaboration with local authorities.”
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on a case-by-case basis in consultation

proximately 30 sq. km. (11.6 sq. mi.) of

with local authorities. An area with re-

land. With eight years left of the conven-

strictions will not be created based on

tion extension, Thailand’s national and

an assessed low impact.

international capacity needs to be big

Follow-on Technical Survey. A fol-

enough to cover 4 sq. km. (1.5 sq. mi.)

low-on Technical Survey concept was

of land per year. This is almost twice the

developed in collaboration with TMAC.

size of the current clearance capacity—

APOPO-PRO’s role is not to conduct full

a challenging but indeed tangible task.

Technical Survey at this stage; instead
the HMAUs were partially trained to

Conclusion

do it. APOPO-PRO will likely start con-

With proper identification, mark-

ducting follow-on Technical Survey and

ing and use of clear terminology, the

clearance in 2012. The Technical Survey

incident in the Khmer Rouge in July

concept follows the logical framework

could have been avoided. In hindsight,

of the Non-technical Survey and com-

Thailand’s new land-release approach

plements the decision-making process

could drastically shorten the lifespan of

to release land by measuring degrees of

the remaining minefields and boost the

confidence in areas being mine-free.

number of cleared mines. Mines will

It is too early to predict the final

claim fewer victims, and full APMBC

outcome of the survey. Preliminary

compliance is not beyond the realm of

Figure 1. Diagram illustrating the process of resolving Thailand’s mine problem. The blue line indicates the current status.

results from one month of fieldwork,

possibility.

Graphic courtesy of the author/CISR.

however, indicate that between 10 and
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20 percent of suspect land (now reinitially established to score the value of individual evidence.

dence. The survey concept distinguishes consciously between

classified as SHA) will be classified as

A scorecard incorporating every useful piece of potential

mine and UXO evidence. The latter is not covered by the

CHA from the survey. The situation

Non-technical Survey information was developed with a scor-

APMBC and will be reported separately.

could be different in other places along

Technical Survey. A Technical Survey component was es-

the border, and the final outcome may

Affinity between the Non-technical Survey and the Tech-

tablished for selective deployment into areas where a tactical

or may not be an improvement. The

nical Survey. The Non-technical Survey will define the mini-

assessment provides multiple options or reasons for placing

remaining land will be reclassified as

mum requirements for follow-on Technical Survey before land

mines during the war. The component does not aim to con-

either cancelled areas or area with re-

can be released. When sectors are scored differently within

duct full Technical Survey, where the aim is to define the exact

strictions. TMAC and APOPO-PRO

the same CHA, this may justify a graded Technical Survey re-

boundaries of mined areas or to release land. APOPO-PRO’s

developed appropriate forms for sepa-

sponse. Most previous surveys failed to quantify affinity be-

Technical Survey capacity reinforces the Non-technical Sur-

rate reporting of CHA, cancelled areas

tween the Non-technical Survey and Technical Survey for a

vey, where needed, to justify tighter CHA polygons. The Non-

and area with restrictions.

tailored and more efficient Technical Survey response.

technical Survey component (two manual-demining teams)

If we assume that the APOPO-PRO

is thus considered part of the Non-technical Survey and will

survey will result in 10 percent of sus-

help determine CHA and/or cancel land.

pect land being classified as CHA,

ing value for each piece of information.

Drawing polygons. The survey teams were trained to draw
tight CHA polygons based on an assessment of evidence coupled with a war-tactical assessment.
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Land classification. Following the Non-technical Sur-

Thailand will need to address 54 sq. km.

Sector division of CHAs. Following drawing of tight poly-

vey, land will be classified as a CHA, cancelled area or area

(20.8 sq. mi.) of suspected-hazardous

gons, there may be scope to subdivide the CHA into smaller

with restrictions. This last classification will only occur in

land proactively to reach its ultimate

sectors. This is based on various degrees of evidence in dif-

cases where all reasonable effort is made to conduct evi-

goal as a mine-free state. Thailand will

ferent parts of the CHA (regarding the presence or absence

dence-based Non-technical Survey, but the survey failed to

further need to maintain an effective

of mines). Each sector will state whether mines are present or

conclude because of a lack of evidence or access to land. A

reactive-response capacity for APMBC

not. The amount and quality of evidence from the survey will

precondition for drawing an area with restrictions is that

compliance. If we further assume that

generate a degree of confidence in these statements.

there is no evidence of mines in specific parts of a larger

Technical Survey and/or clearance as-

Mines versus unexploded ordnance. Evidence of explo-

area. If real mine evidence exists, a CHA will be created

sets will be needed on 60 percent of this

sions or unexploded ordnance is not the same as mine evi-

around it. TMAC will define type and level of restriction

ground, assets will be used to cover ap-
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